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NOTE
EXCLUDING THE COMMUNE FROM SUBURBIA. THE
USE OF ZONING FOR SOCIAL CONTROL
Zoning ordinances have increasingly been employed as a mecha-
nism for the control and exclusion of innovative domestic life-styles
such as the commune. Under the gmse of residential single-family
zoning, this note suggests, municipalities have sought to achieve social
conformity while ostensibly pursuing the more limited zoning objec-
tives of land-use regulation.1
There is, of course, a well-established legal tradition affirmatively
recognizing the conventional familyI American courts have long re-
1. The power of a municipality or other political subdivision to enact zoning
legislation rests upon the police power under a grant from the state. Most states
have codified this authority in terms similar to the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act, promulgated by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1926. This model act
explictly confines zoning objectives: "[Zoning] regulations shall be made in accord-
ance with a comprehensive plan and designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to
secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general
welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid
undue concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate provision of transporta-
tion, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements." U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZoNING ENABLING AcT § "3 (1926). For a general
background on the scope of zoning authority and limitations on zoning objectives see
1 R. ANmERSON, AMEUCiAN LAw OF ZONING §§ 2.01-5.20 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
ANDERSON]; 1 H. RATHOPF, THE LAw OF ZOING AND PLANNING §§ 2-1-4-12 (3d
ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as RATHKOPF].
2. Typical of the prevailing judicial attitude is Justice Traynor's observation that
"The family is the basic unit of our society, the center of the personal affections that
ennoble and enrich human life." De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 863-64,
250 P.2d 598, 601 (1952). In Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F Supp.
908 (N.D. Cal. 1970), Judge Wollenberg recently emphasized this point by distin-
guishmg the conventional family from the commune: "The traditional family is an
institution reinforced by biological and legal ties which are difficult, or impossible, to
sunder. It plays a role in educating and nourishing the young which, far from
being "voluntary", is often compulsory. Finally, it has been a means, for uncounted
millema, of satisfying the deepest emotional and physical needs of human bemgs."
Id. at 911.
The special recognition of the conventional family is not confined to American
legal thinking. The International Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly in 1948, states: "The family is the natural and fundamental group
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garded the promotion of the general welfare-and indeed, the very sur-
vival of society-as dependent upon the perpetuation of this unit.3 This
view has generated a substantial body of "family law" devoted to the
definition, regulation, and protection of family interests. 4  The courts,
however, do not show the same unanimity with regard to the identifi-
cation and treatment of groups which deviate from the preferred stand-
ard.' The zoning subterfuge has in effect circumvented explicit judi-
cial consideration of this problem.
In exploring this thesis, this note will present: (1) a brief descrip-
tion of the evolution of the zoning practices to exclude social noncon-
formists;6 (2) a survey of resultant litigation; and (3) a discussion of
currently unresolved constitutional questions.
The Origins of The Zoning Subterfuge
The suburban ideal of the private family home has long received
judicial recognition and reinforcement." Ever since judicial approval
unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the state." 3 U.N. GAOR,
Part I, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
3. See Mencher, Social Authority and the Family, 29 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY
164 (1964); N. BELL & E. VOGEL, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO THE FAMILY 1-33
(1960).
4. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW (1965).
5. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) attempts to deal with the matter in
regard to a state law discriminating against illegitimate children for inheritance pur-
poses. Justice Black, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed Louisiana's right to make
distinctions between conventional legal and unconventional social units: "There is no
biological difference between a wife and a concubine, nor does the Constitution re-
quire that there be such a difference before the State may assert its power to protect
the wife and her children against the claims of a concubine and her children.
The social difference between a wife and a concubine is analogous to the difference
between a legitimate and an illegitimate child. One set of relationships is socially
sanctioned, legally recognized, and gives rise to various rights and duties. The other
set of relationships is illicit and beyond the recognition of the law. . . . [Tihe power
to make rules to establish, protect, and strengthen family life . . . is committed by the
Constitution of the United States and the people of Louisiana to the legislature of
that State." Id. at 538.
6. Much attention has recently been afforded a related phenomenon, the use
of zoning regulations to exclude the indigent. This is the practice that is generally
designated "exclusionary" or "snob zoning." See, e.g., Marcus, Exclusionary Zoning:
The Need for a Regional Planning Context, 16 N.Y.L.F. 732 (1970); Sager, Tight
Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L.
REv. 767 (1969); Williams & Wacks, Segregation of Residential Areas along Economic
Lines, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 827 (1969); Symposium-Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 465 (1971); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARv. L. REv.
1645 (1971); Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Zoning-Snob Zoning:
Must a Man's Home be a Castle?, 69 MICH. L. REv. 339 (1970-71). The exclusion
of individuals on the basis of "nonfamily" status has not been discussed in these com-
mentaries.
7. Courts have gone to extreme lengths in extolling the virtues of private home
of comprehensive zoning over four decades ago, communities have
lawfully segregated residential from commercial uses of the land."
The authority to further create subclasses of residential districts rests
on equally well-established precedent.9
Although local zoning statutes vary in the specificity of their classi-
fications, most communities have attempted to isolate the private dwell-
ing unit from other residential structures and have designated it the
highest form of land use.10 The ordinances accomplishing this segre-
gation typically employ the term "single-family dwelling" to distinguish
the private home from apartments, boarding houses, residence halls,
hotels, trailers, and other accommodations. In its original sense, the
phrase "single-family" was intended simply as a designation of a physi-
cal structure and not as a regulation on type of dwelling occupancy.'1
ownership. The views of the California Supreme Court (upholding the zoned ex-
clusion of multifamily dwellings) are typical: "The establishment of . . [single-
family] districts is for the general welfare because it tends to promote and perpetuate
the American home. . . The home and its intrinsic influences are the very founda-
tion of good citizenship, and any factor contributing to the establishment of homes
and the fostering of home life doubtless tends to the enhancement not only of
community life but of the life of the nation as a whole ...
"With ownership comes stability, the welding together of family ties and better
attention to the rearing of children. With ownership comes increased interest in the
promotion of public agencies, such as church and school ....
"It is needless to further analyze and enumerate all of the factors which make a
single family home more desirable for the promotion and perpetuation of family life.
: I * It will suffice to say that there is a sentiment practically universal, that this
is so." Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 492-493, 234 P. 381, 386-387
(1925). See Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 (1925) (dictum); Bab-
cock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REv.
1040 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Babcock & Bosselman].
8. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
9. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925); Wuffsohn
v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 (1925); 1 ANDERSON, supra note 1, at § 8.22;
1 RATHKOPF, supra note 1, at 14-1 to -13.
10. Alfred Bettman foresaw this development two years before the U.S. Supreme
Court officially sanctioned the segregation in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926): "Promotion of the single family home ...is deemed good
policy in America." Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARv. L. REv. 834, 839-40
(1924).
For judicial rationalization of this practice in terms of general welfare criteria see
Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 492-93, 234 P. 381, 386-87 (1925)
quoted in note 7 supra; Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 '(1925);
Rice v. Van Vranken, 132 Misc. 82, 229 N.Y.S. 32 (Sup. Ct. 1928), afj'd, 225 App.
Div. 179, 232 N.Y.S. 506 (App. Div. 1929), affd 255 N.Y. 541, 175 N.E. 304 (1930).
Babcock and Bosselman summarize the judicial sentiment on this point: "Single family
housing . . . was romanticized as contributing to patriotism, and exemplifying in
every respect the American way of life." Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 7, at 1046.
11. The term "single-family" primarily served to distinguish the single dwelling
unit from apartment houses, and other multi-unit homes.
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Nonetheless, from the beginning such ordinances were occasion-
ally relied upon in efforts to evict various undesired elements from
residential communities. However, because the early statutes generally
left "single-family" undefined (or included only loose definitions as
"single-housekeeping units") these efforts usually failed. The courts
were initially reluctant to interpret the ordinances as requiring literal
compliance-i.e., occupation by social units related in blood, marriage,
or adoption. Thus the occupancies of "single-family dwellings" by
two students, 12 three priests," and even twenty nurses14 were not
found to violate zoning restrictions. There were, however, other groups
whose attempts to reside in prime residential areas fared less well. At
an early date the courts established the precedent of excluding fraterni-
ties, sororities, college groups,15 and families with boarders' precisely
on the grounds that they did not constitute single-family units.
In the last few years communities have been confronted with new
domestic groups seeking entry to the more desirable residential areas.
Prominent among these is the commune, designated by one court as
the "voluntary family," 17 and consisting of legally unrelated individuals
dwelling together as a single, nonprofit social unit. Communities, in-
tolerant of these alternative social groups, have sought various legal
means for their exclusion and control. In the search, zoning has
emerged as an effective instrument for achieving this exclusionary ob-
jective.
In some instances, localities have merely initiated more restrictive
enforcement of already existent zoning ordinances. In Palo Alto, for
example, this practice was stimulated by a newspaper article announc-
ing the formation of Downtown Palo Alto, Inc., an organization of
local businessmen and landowners dedicated to the exclusion of per-
sons causing confrontations within the city. 18 To accomplish this end,
Downtown Palo Alto, Inc. -urged a threefold attack consisting of active
enforcement of the city's single-family zoning ordinance, invitations to
neighbors to increase complaints of zoning violations, and a call upon
landlords to evict single-family deviants.19
The conflicting claims of unconventional social units and paro-
12. Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1962).
13. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis.
609, 66 N.W.2d 627 (1954).
14. Robertson v. Western Baptist Hosp., 267 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954).
15. See text accompanying notes 51-56 infra.
16. See, e.g., Baddour v. City of Long Beach, 279 N.Y. 167, 18 N.E.2d 18
(1938), appeal dismissed, 308 U.S. 503 (1939).
17. Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
18. Brief for Appellants at 7-8, Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F.
Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
19. Id.
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chial municipalities have not been restricted to the college communi-
ties. One of the more virulent legal confrontations, for example, has
been occurring in the eastern resort area.20  This latter episode affords
a prime illustration of how the originally "innocent" zoning ordinance
has emerged as an effective weapon of social exclusion.
In Larson v. Mayor and Council of the Borough of Spring Lake
Heights,21 plaintiffs were two New Jersey seaside communities faced
with similar summertime influxes of young persons. Local officials
were roused to action by complaints that the shared tenancies of these
people produced "noise . . . parking and traffic congestion, obscene
language and lewd conduct, including fornicating in cars on the public
streets [and] [ilncidents of immoral conduct and illicit relations inside
the dwellings .... "22 Their first official response was to pass a police
ordinance prohibiting all but families23 from renting and occupying the
residences within the municipalities. The New Jersey Superior Court,
however, struck down the ordinance as being an unreasonable exercise
of the police power. 24 Especially significant was the court's parting ad-
vice:
It should be mentioned that the decision of this case in-
volves no opinion as to the validity of a properly enacted zoning
ordinance which might deal with the subject in similar fashion to
the ordinances in question. Several cases have upheld ordinances
which have zoned municipalities for single-family use . . .5
New Jersey communities did not take long to follow the court's
broad hint, and in March 1970, the Borough of Manasquan amended
its zoning plan to include a new restrictive definition of "family" 26
20. E.g., Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341,
271 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970); Larson v. Mayor of Spring Lake Heights, 99 N.J.
Super. 365, 240 A.2d 31 (L. Div. 1968).
21. 99 N.J. Super. 365, 240 A.2d 31 (L. Div. 1968).
22. Id. at 369, 240 A.2d at 33.
23. "Family" was defined in the ordinance as: "A collective group of persons
related by kinship, adoption, blood or marriage, living together under the same roof, in a
common household whose relationship is of a permanent and distinct domestic char-
acter and not resort or seasonal in character or nature, including any domestic
servants, lodgers, boarders or guests." Id. at 370, 240 A.2d at 34.
24. Id. at 373-376, 240 A.2d at 36-38.
25. Id. at 376, 240 A.2d at 38.
26. The definition of "family" here was broader than the original restriction
attempted in the first police ordinance quoted in note 23 supra. The zoning definition
allowed "a collective number of persons living together in one house, whose relation-
ship is of a permanent and distinct domestic character, and cooking as a single house-
keeping unit .... ." The definition expressly excluded a "society, club, fraternity,
sorority, association, lodge, combine, federation, group or organization [and] a group
of individuals whose association is temporary and resort-seasonal in ... nature."
Quoted in Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 111 N.J. Super. 359, 363-64,
268 A.2d 333, 335 (L. Div. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513
(1971).
May 19721 ZONING FOR SOCIAL CONTROL
and a prohibition of all nonfamily residential occupancy. The same
court which had previously passed negatively upon the original police
ordinance, now sustained the new regulation as a valid exercise of the
zoning power.2 7
The episode strikingly reveals the degree to which the court it-
self prompted the city's exclusionary efforts. Although the durability
of this particular holding is open to question,28 the New Jersey incident
does furnish one clear example of how the single-family ordinance has
been converted from its original purpose29 into an effective instrument
of social control.
A Survey of Single-Family Zoning Litigation
No single pattern of judicial response emerges with regard to the
phenomena of exclusionary single-family zoning. This is partly due
to the fact that legal challenges have arisen from different legislative
contexts. In order, therefore, to adequately represent the present state
of the controversy, it is useful to separately consider four distinct
types of zoning ordinances and their resultant litigation. Accordingly,
ordinances containing "single-family" limitations may be classified on
the basis of the definitional restrictiveness of the term "family." These
types include ordinances which: (1) altogether lack a definition;
(2) broadly define "family" as a "single-housekeeping unit"; (3) en-
compass either conventional families or a limited number of unrelated
persons; and (4) exclusively restrict "family" to a legal group related
by blood, marriage, or adoption. The attempt to accomplish exclu-
sionary social objectives using each of these statutory variants has gen-
erated different court responses, to be surveyed below.
27. Id.
28. A contrary result was reached by another New Jersey Superior Court four
months later, in interpreting a zoning ordinance limiting nonfamily occupancy to two
unrelated persons. In a supplemental opinion the court declared: 'To the extent that
Kirsch holds or implies that arbitrariness or unreasonableness of classification which
would invalidate an ordinance adopted under the general police powers of municipali-
ties ... is saved from condemnation by mere reason of the incorporation of the
same classification into a zoning ordinance, we disagree ....... Gabe Collins Realty,
Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 351, 271 A.2d 430, 435 (App. Div.
1970). The court, however, distinguished the Kirsch holding from the Larson case
on the grounds that the latter litigation involved a more restrictive definition of "fam-
ily." Id.
29. One qualification is required: even primitive zoning ordinances which only
purported to regulate external building structure were not totally "innocent." For
there were implicit identifications of certain "undesirable" social classes with types of
residences. See, e.g., Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 7, at 1068-72, who write of
the "whispered" and "subconscious" reasons behind suburban zoning. In the main,
however, such ordinances were not intended to "penetrate so deeply . . .into the in-
ternal composition of a single housekeeping unit." City of Des Plaines v. Trottner,
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"Family" Undefined
The single-family zoning ordinance which altogether lacks a defi-
nition of the term "family" forces the court to assume a more partici-
patory role. Instances of such legislative omission are, however, rare.80
In general, the courts have approached these cases on a pragmatic, ad
hoe basis without attempting to universally remedy the definitional
void.3'
Planning and Zoning Commission v. Synanon Foundation, Inc. is
a case in point.32 The action here concerned efforts by the town of
Westport to prevent Synanon from leasing a large home in a prime
residential area zoned for "one family per lot." The trial court ruled
that the term "family" encompassed Synanon's communal living arrange-
ment (where members claimed to cook, eat, sleep, work, and conduct
other activities together as a single social unit).38 This liberal inter-
pretation was rejected on appeal by the Supreme Court of Connecticut,
despite its acknowledgment that "the word 'family' is one of indefinite
conception which gives rise to varying definitions. '3 4  The court felt
constrained to enforce the ordinance in a manner which would not ren-
der the phrase "one family" superfluous.35 Viewing the statute as a
density regulation, it therefore found that Synanon's variable eleven to
thirty-four person occupancy exceeded the bounds of "one family. '3 6
The court did not, however, offer a definition of "family" to serve fu-
ture applications of the ordinance.
34 Ill. 2d 432, 438, 216 N.E.2d 116, 120 (1966); accord, Baddour v. City of Long
Beach, 279 N.Y. 167, 179, 18 N.E.2d 18, 23 (1938) '(dissenting opinion).
30. The definitional void has arisen more frequently in a related context: the
judicial interpretation of restrictive covenants. The courts have approached these
cases largely on an individual basis, with a slight bias favoring a more liberal, in-
clusive interpretation. See, e.g., Boston-Edison Protective Ass'n v. Paulist Fathers,
306 Mich. 253, 10 N.W.2d 847 (1943) (holding that the residency of five priests
did not violate the "family" covenant restriction); Hunter Tract Improvement Co. v.
Corporation of the Catholic Bishop, 98 Wash. 112, 167 P. 100 (1917) (finding that the
"family" character of a home was not altered by the occupancy of 12-15 Ursiline
nuns or "the fact that religious services are held in the house every morning by a priest,
or that a small altar has been erected ... ." Id. at 114, 167 P. at 101. Contra, e.g.,
Simons v. Work of God Corp., 36 Ill. App. 2d 199, 183 N.E.2d 729 (1962) (excluding
five members of a secular organization connected with the Catholic Church); Seeley v.
Phi Sigma Delta House Corp., 245 Mich. 252, 222 N.W. 180 (1928) (excluding a
fraternity).
31. "The word 'family' is an elastic term and is applied in many ways." Robert-
son v. Western Baptist Hosp., 267 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954) (applied in
this instance to include the shared residency of twenty nurses).
32. 153 Conn. 305, 216 A.2d 442 (1966).
33. Id. at 308, 216 A.2d 443 (1966).
34. Id. at 309, 216 A.2d at 444.
35. Id. at 310, 215 A.2d at 443.
36. Id. at 310, 216 A.2d at 444.
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Four years previously, the California District Court of Appeal had
been faced with a similarly vague zoning ordinance. In Brady v. Su-
perior Court37 the city of Atherton attempted to use the contempt proc-
ess to enforce the single-family restriction. The offending occupancy
was that of the homeowner's son and an unrelated fellow Stanford
University graduate student. In the absence of a statutory definition
of "family," the trial court had furnished its own:
"[Tlhe phrase 'single family' as used in the Zoning Ordinances
means a unit that has a social status, a head who has a right, at
least in a limited way, to direct and control those gathered into the
household, a moral or legal obligation of a head to support the other
members and a state of at least partial dependence by the other
members for this support. '38
In accordance with this definition, the trial court found the tenancy of
the two students to be in violation of the ordinance. 39  The court of
appeal, however, reversed the holding, noting that the trial court's defi-
nition requiring a head of household and dependents would exclude
home occupation by single persons-an unacceptable restriction.4" The
court therefore substituted its own, more liberal definition of "family"
as "an individual or a group of persons living on the premises as a single
housekeeping unit."41  In so doing, the court shifted the criteria from
the formal status of the occupants to their manner of use.42 With this
broader view, the court had little difficulty in holding that the stu-
dents' shared use of the facilities did meet the "single-family" test.43
The Brady case, however, remains a rather isolated instance of judi-
cial participation in the definition process.
The paucity of cases involving exclusionary efforts based upon
such vague zoning ordinances makes generalization of limited value.
However, considered along with related litigation involving the enforce-
ment of restrictive covenants44 these cases do evidence judicial reluc-
tance to restrict interpretation of "single family" to its popular and
narrower sense.
37. 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1962).
38. Id. at 71, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 243, quoting trial court.
39. Id. at 72, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
40. Id. at 77-78, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
41. Id. at 77, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
42. The court did qualify this holding with dictum that "if more than one person
does occupy the premises, the parties must live together in the same relationship or
manner of a family. Thus the relationship cannot be an organizational one, such as
that of a social club or fraternity, which rests upon a social bond rather than a family
status." Id. at 78, 19 Cal. Rptr. 247-48.
43. Id. at 82, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
44. See note 30 supra.
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"Family" as a "Single Housekeeping Unit"
A more common variant of the single-family classification incor-
porates a statutory definition of "family" as a "single housekeeping
unit. ' 45  In general, this type of ordinance has proved less amenable
to manipulation for attainment of exclusionary zoning objectives. In
Robertson v. Western Baptist Hospital,40 for example, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals held that the tenancy of twenty student nurses satis-
fied the description of a "single housekeeping unit" and therefore did
not offend single-family zoning restrictions.
In a similar fashion the courts have conferred "family" status
on a sorority,47 a group of novices and their Mother Superior,48 and
even a college residence hall housing sixty.49 The courts have justified
these holdings with arguments of judicial self-restraint. The New
York supreme court's pronouncements on the matter are typical:
The city's legislative body has the right to define the term
"family." It has done so, placing no limitation on the number of
persons constituting a family, nor does it require that the members
thereof be related by blood or marriage. We may not impose
any restrictions not contained in the ordinance.50
Against this pattern of judicial liberality, one major exception must
be noted. The courts have not generally sanctioned fraternity and
sorority residence even when such units have expressly conformed
45. This is the form of San Francisco's regulation, for example. SAN FRAN-
cisco, CAL., CoDn, pt. II, ch. II, § 102.8 (1968).
46. 267 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954).
47. Syracuse v. Snow, 123 Misc. 568, 205 N.Y.S. 785 (1924). "A college
sorority is a family, a college family, perhaps, but nevertheless its membership not
only live together, and cook together, but are bound together by fraternal ties; ties
that, in many instances, are more binding and enduring than those of kinship." Id.
at 572-73, 205 N.Y.S. at 789.
48. "The only noticeable difference between this family and any other family
would be that the novices would wear a religious habit or garb." Carroll v. City
of Miami Beach, 198 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). In a parallel
fashion the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that residential use of a dwelling by
eight priests and laymen was within the character of the ordinance: "In construing
a zoning ordinance we perceive no reasonable distinction in a room set apart in a
residence for use as a chapel as compared to one devoted to purposes such as ball-
room, music room, conservatory, or recreation room, which uses undoubtedly would
be permitted . . . ." Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette v. Village of Whitefish
Bay, 267 Wis. 609, 616, 66 N.W.2d 627, 631 (1954).
49. The relevant definition here described "family" as "one or more persons
occupying a dwelling unit as a single, non-profit housekeeping unit." The New York
court found that the proposed residence hall complied. In re Laporte, 2 App. Div.
2d 710, 152 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1956).
50. Id. at 710-11, 152 N.Y.S.2d at 918; accord, Carroll v. City of Miami
Beach, 198 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Missionaries of Our Lady of
La Salette v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis. 609, 614-15, 66 N.W.2d 627, 630
(1954).
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with the statutory "single housekeeping unit" test.51 Cassidy v. Trie-
be152 remains the leading representative of this position. The Cassidy
family sought an injunction against the mayor and city of Peoria to pre-
vent interference with their prospective sale of a private home located
in a two-family district. The purchaser under consideration was a
sorority desiring to house ten female students and their housemother.
The Illinois appellate court noted that "members of a college sorority
or fraternity are bound together by enduring fraternal ties," but held
that they are not members of a family in the zoning sense. 3
The Cassidy case made clear the fact that density considerations
were not the basis for the court's confirmation of the sorority ex-
clusion-the argument used by the Connecticut Supreme Court against
Synanon.5 4 In fact the Cassidy family itself consisted of eleven mem-
bers, and under the particular terms of the zoning ordinance, their
home could have been converted into a duplex to legally house an un-
limited number of family persons.55
The real basis for the courts' consistent willingness to exclude
fraternities and sororities from prime residential areas followed from
its unchallenged conception concerning the styles of fraternal living.
This attitude is perhaps best enunciated in an early Wisconsin Su-
preme Court opinion oft cited by courts passing on the matter:
[Ilt is a matter of common knowledge and a well established
fact that college students belonging to [fraternities] are, for the most
part, exuberant and irresponsible young men, given to noisy,
boisterous, hilarious, and destructive habits; that such students do
not keep regular hours, engage in wrestling, scuffling, and "rough
house" bouts in their rooms, are addicted to the use and abuse of
vibrant and sonorous musical instruments, and render premises in-
habited by them unsuitable for family residence purposes . *...56
51. See, e.g., Long Beach v. California Lambda Chapter of Sigma Alpha Epsilon
Fraternity, 255 Cal. App. 2d 789, 63 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1967); Cassidy v. Triebel, 337
IIl. App. 117, 85 N.E.2d 461 (1948); Theta Kappa, Inc. v. Terre Haute, 226
N.E.2d 907 (Ind. App. 1967); Pettis v. Alpha Alpha Chapter of Phi Beta Pi, 115
Neb. 525, 213 N.W. 835 (1927); Schenectady v. Alumni Ass'n of Union Chapter, Delta
Chi Fraternity, 5 App. Div. 2d 14, 168 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1957). Contra, In re Laporte,
2 App. Div. 2d 710, 152 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1956); Syracuse v. Snow, 123 Misc. 568,
205 N.Y.S. 785 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
52. 337 Ill. App. 117, 85 N.E.2d 461 (1948).
53. Id. at 127, 85 N.E.2d at 466.
54. 153 Conn. 305, 216 A.2d 442 (1966).
55. 337 Ill. App. 117, 127, 85 N.E.2d 461, 466 (1948).
56. Hannan v. Harper, 189 Wis. 588, 590, 208 N.W. 255, 256 (1926); accord,
Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 540, 212 P.2d 177, 180-81
(1949). Even courts which have liberally construed the single-family ordinance in
specific situations expressly distinguish fraternities. See, e.g., Robertson v. Western
Baptist Hosp., 267 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954) and Brady v. Superior Court,
200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 78-80, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242, 248-49 (1962).
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Apart from the fraternity exception, however, the courts have ap-
peared unwilling to read any additional attributes into the "single
housekeeping unit" ordinance. Municipalities desiring to more effec-
tively regulate the composition of residential areas have therefore
resorted to more restrictive zoning ordinances.
Conventional Family or Numerically Limited Exceptions
The third type of single-family zoning ordinance squarely con-
fronts the issue of residency composition: it restricts occupancy to a
limited number of unrelated individuals (usually 2 to 5) or a con-
ventional family of unlimited size.17  This ordinance has proved most
effective in community efforts to evict nonconforming social units.
Two recent cases, arising in California 8 and New Jersey59 illustrate the
exclusionary potential of this type of ordinance.
In Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan ° the plaintiffs were mem-
bers of communal groups seeking an injunction against Palo Alto of-
ficials for alleged harassment under the "guise!' of zoning enforce-
ment." The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the city's
ordinance which zoned "R-1 Residential" neighborhoods for exclusive
occupancy by a legal family or a group not exceeding four in number
and living as a single housekeeping unit.6 2
Judge Wollenberg, writing for the federal district court, rejected
the plaintiffs' arguments that their right to equal protection was
abridged by the zoning ordinance. 3 The court instead found ample
legal bases for the regulation resting upon control of density, noise,
traffic and parking congestion, and distortion of the rent structure. 64
A slightly different set of facts was involved in Gabe Collins
Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City.65  In 1967 Margate City had
amended its zoning ordinances for the express purpose of eliminating
summer rentals to large groups of unrelated young persons.6 6 The
57. Los Angeles, for example, defines "family" as: "An individual, or two (2) or
more persons related . . . or a group of not more than five (5) persons (excluding
servants) who need not be related .. . living together as a single housekeeping
unit." Los ANGELES, CAL., CODE § 12.03 (1970).
58. Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
59. Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341,
271 A.2d 430 (1970).
60. 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
61. Id. at 909.
62. PALo ALTO, CAL., CODB §§ 18.04.210, 18.88.050 (1960).
63. 321 F. Supp. at 912. For an extended discussion of this case see text ac-
companying notes 125-32 infra.
64. Id.
65. Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341,
271 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970).
66. Id. at 342, 271 A.2d at 430.
May 1972] 1469
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
new ordinances restricted the occupancy of single family dwellings to
conventional family units or "not more than two unrelated persons oc-
cupying a dwelling as a single non-profit housekeeping unit. 67
Unlike the Palo Alto litigation, plaintiffs in this case were property
owners seeking higher rentals obtainable from the excluded tenants.
For this reason, the constitutional challenge revolved around due proc-
ess instead of equal protection considerations.
The New Jersey Superior Court found the zoning ordinance to be
unreasonably restrictive of the ordinary and natural utility of such
property as dwellings for people, and of the right of unrelated peo-
ple in reasonable number to have recourse to common house-
keeping facilities in circumstances free of detriment to the general
health, safety and welfare.68
Even with a presumption of validity in favor of the ordinance, the
court found the measure to be a "sweepingly excessive restriction of
property rights as against the problem sought to be dealt with, and in le-
gal contemplation deprives plaintiffs of their property without due proc-
ess."
69
Although the Palo Alto and New Jersey cases reached opposite
conclusions on the constitutionality of the zoning ordinances, the cases
can be reconciled on the basis of factual differences. The New Jer-
sey court placed considerable emphasis on the actual numerical limita-
tion involved:
Dwelling units of a size adequate to accommodate a normal family
are reasonably susceptible of occupancy by more than two unre-
lated persons without such accompanying threat to the public wel-
fare, in any of its many aspects ... as warrants a restriction of oc-
cupancy to so few a number.70
Thus, the New Jersey court left open the question of whether it would
sustain a zoning ordinance involving a more reasonable limitation on
the number of unrelated persons allowed to share a dwelling.
At the present, the single-family zoning ordinance with a reason-
able allowance for unrelated persons appears to have withstood first
constitutional challenges.
"Family" Limited to a Legal Unit
The real test of judicial acceptance of exclusionary family zoning
occurs in litigation concerning the single-family ordinance which pro-
hibits all but persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption from re-
siding in prime areas. Precisely this type of statute was involved in
67. Id.
68. Id. at 349, 271 A.2d at 434.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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City of Newark v. Johnson7 where the Essex County court upheld both
the ordinance and its specific enforcement. Ironically, the offending
units were conventional families who had brought foster children into
their homes in accordance with a state statute. 72  As such children
were legally unrelated to the recipient families, their presence vio-
lated Newark's zoning ordinance. The New Jersey court sustained the
single-family ordinance as a valid regulation of neighborhood density,
noting that overpopulation of children tended to diminish real estate
values.7 3 More recent New Jersey holdings, however, somewhat dimin-
ish the authority of the Newark case.74
In City of Des Plaines v. Trottner75 the Supreme Court of Illinois,
reviewing a similar ordinance 76 five years later, found the Newark hold-
ing to be not "particularly persuasive. '77  The court acknowledged a
possible relationship between large groups of unrelated persons and
increased neighborhood instability, but noted that "none of these ob-
servations reflects a universal truth.7 8
The factual circumstances of the Illinois case followed the typical
pattern: the city of Des Plaines attempted to use the zoning system
to prevent an owner from leasing her residential home to four, young,
unrelated men. The city was successful at the trial level: the court
granted Des Plaines' injunction, fined the defendants $100, and
awarded the city attorney's fees. On appeal to the supreme court, how-
ever, the holding was reversed. 79 Although the Illinois Supreme Court
discussed the constitutional aspects of the case, it chose to overturn the
ordinance on the narrower issue of lack of statutory authorization:
The General Assembly has not specifically authorized the
adoption of zoning ordinances that penetrate so deeply as this one
does into the internal composition of a single housekeeping unit.
71. 70 N.J. Super. 381, 175 A.2d 500 (L. Div. 1961). Newark's ordinance in-
cluded a definition of '"amily" as "one or more persons who live together in one
dwelling unit and maintain a common household and who are related by blood, mar-
riage or adoption." Id. at 384, 175 A.2d 501.
72. Id. at 384, 175 A.2d at 501.
73. Id. at 387, 175 A.2d at 503.
74. See, e.g., Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super.
341, 271 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970), discussed in text accompanying notes 65-70
supra.
75. 34 111. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966).
76. The Illinois ordinance under review read: "A 'family' consists of one or
more persons each related to the other by blood (or adoption or marriage), together
with such relatives' respective spouses, who are living together in a single dwelling and
maintaining a common household. A 'family' includes any domestic servants and not
more than one gratuitous guest residing with said 'amily'." Id. at 433-34, 216 N.E.2d
at 117.
77. Id. at 437, 216 N.E.2d at 119.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 438, 216 N.E.2d at 120.
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Until it has done so, we are of the opinion that we should not read
the general authority that it has delegated to extend so far. Such a
reading would generate constitutional questions of a kind sug-
gested by the defendants, concerning which we express no opin-
ion.80
The Illinois case is significant because it represents the highest
level at which the most restrictive single-family zoning ordinance
has been litigated. Its precedent value, however, is diminished by the
fact that the court rested its decision on the peculiarities of the Illi-
nois-municipality zoning arrangement, rather than upon the primary
constitutional questions.
Summary
The above zoning litigation fails to yield a single, consistent pat-
tern of judicial response, indicating the undeveloped state of the law in
this realm. Most courts have been content to approach each case in
an individual fashion, avoiding the larger doctrinal questions. In some
instances this has produced inconsistent holdings by courts operating
within the same jurisdiction."' It is unlikely that this condition will
long continue. The increasing volume of litigation will itself create
pressure upon the appellate courts for a definitive resolution of the
issues.
The Constitutional Test: Equal Protection
And the Single-Family Ordinance
Legislative classifications are by definition discriminatory in na-
ture, allocating unequal benefits and burdens on the classes distin-
guished. 2  The single-family zoning ordinance is no exception. Al-
though the United States Constitution does not prohibit legislation hav-
ing a discriminatory effect,1 it does impose certain principles of re-
80. The dissenting judge in Baddour v. City of Long Beach, 279 N.Y. 167, 18
N.E.2d 18 (1938) anticipated this argument 28 years earlier: "The restriction that
but one housekeeping unit shall occupy a one-family residence doubtless has an ad-
missible relation to the public welfare. But the mere quality or composition of
such units could not reasonably have been defined or limited by a requirement that
members must be united by particular motives or relationships. Had this ordinance
declared a discrimination of that kind, it would, in my opinion, have been constitu-
tionally invalid. Id. at 179, 18 N.E.2d at 23.
81. See, e.g., Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J.
Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970); Larson v. Mayor, 99 N.J. Super. 365,
240 A.2d 31 (L. Div. 1968); City of Newark v. Johnson, 70 N.J. Super. 381, 175 A.2d
500 (L. Div. 1961).
82. "[T]he very idea of classification is that of inequality .... "Atchison, T. &
S.F.R.R. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 86, 106 (1898).
83. See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1887); Barbier v. Connolly,
113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885); Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30 (1879).
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straint collectively known as the equal protection doctrine.8 4 As the
courts are becoming increasingly sensitive to the manifestations of ex-
clusionary zoning,8 5 it is this doctrine which is emerging as the chief
impediment to such zoning practices.
The application of equal protection principles to specific single-
family zoning issues is, however, still in the primitive stages.80 None-
theless, all signs indicate that this area will be the focal point of future
litigation. The remainder of this note will therefore attempt to de-
lineate the primary questions raised in subjecting the single-family ordi-
nance to this constitutional test. Both the substantive and the proced-
ural aspects of the equal protection guarantee will be examined.
Equal Protection: Substantive Questions
Professors Tussman and tenBroek in their often cited exposition,
"The Equal Protection of the Laws,' 8 7 reduce the constitutional mandate
to a single sentence: "A reasonable classification is one which in-
cludes all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose
of the law."' 8 Analysis of legislation in terms of this test becomes a
twofold process, requiring first a determination of the legislative pur-
pose, and second, a finding of whether the legislative discriminations
are sufficiently related to that purpose."" In the past, courts making
such determinations have employed two different standards, depending
upon whether the challenged legislation involved economic or funda-
mental social discriminations." In the former situation, the courts
have applied the restrained "old equal protection" test requiring only
that the classification be rational, with a strong presumption in favor
of such a finding.91 However, where certain "suspect" classifications
84. For a classic exposition of this doctrine see Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Tussman
& tenBroek] and for a recent up-date see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,
82 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
85. See, e.g., Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection,
and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Note, Exclusionary Zoning, and Equal
Protection, 84 HARv. L. Rav. 1645 (1971).
86. The Illinois Supreme Court in City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 I1. 2d
432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966) peripherally noted "constitutional questions" but chose to
decide the issue on narrower grounds. Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F.
Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970), appeal pending, Docket No. 71-1656, is the first case to
rely exclusively upon equal protection considerations.
87. See note 84 supra.
88. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 84, at 346.
89. See id.
90. For a discussion of this distinction see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
91. "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reason-
ably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426
(1961). See also Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1957).
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or "fundamental interests" were involved, the courts have evolved a
stricter "modem equal protection" standard. Under this test, the leg-
islative purpose is more closely scrutinized and the presumption of con-
stitutionality is shifted, requiring that the legislature demonstrate an
overriding need for the discrimination. 2
Traditionally, zoning classifications have been regarded as eco-
nomic in nature, and falling within the first more lax standard of due
process review, the companion of the old equal protection test.9 3
This in fact was the standard used by the United States Supreme Court
in its last pronouncements on zoning four decades ago. 4 However,
with the growing realization of the social implications of certain ex-
clusionary zoning practices, 5 numerous legal observors have urged the
courts to apply the more stringent modem equal protection standards
of review.9" Accordingly, the following analysis will separately con-
sider the single family ordinance under both tests.
92. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
93. Because early zoning challenges were raised by landowners protesting restric-
tions on their property, and not the excluded parties themselves, the arguments were
generally couched in due process terms, rather than equal protection language. How-
ever, the due process standards employed in such cases paralleled the arguments of the
old equal protection test. See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal
Protection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 782, 784 (1969) & note 96 infra;
Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1645 (1971).
94. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Su-
preme Court declared zoning to be immune from constitutional attack unless it
was proved that it was "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial rela-
tion to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare." Id. at 395. The Court
evidenced similar restraint in Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927) where
it declared: "The Common Council of the city . . .concluded that the public welfare
would be promoted [by the zoning ordinance] and it is impossible for us to say that
their conclusion in that respect was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. [T]he settled
rule of this court is that it will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislative
body charged with the primary duty and responsibility of determining the question.
Id. at 328.
95. See, e.g., Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection,
and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 780-82 (1969).
96. Professor Sager is one of the most prominent advocates of this view:
"[The notion of a firm presumption in favor of the validity of the ordinance has no
place in the context of exclusionary zoning. Where it is a landowner who is pro-
testing undue restraint in the use of his land, because there appears to be no sound
basis for the municipality's decision to restrict a given area to residential dwellings, it
is reasonable for the Court to defer to the judgment of the governing unit; it is, in any
event, certainly consistent with the posture of the Supreme Court in the area of econom-
ic regulations generally. But where the complaint of the excluded householder is
being evaluated, the same considerations that have moved the Supreme Court, where
highly sensitive interests are involved, to a presumption flowing in the opposite direc-
tion should apply. At the very least, some attempt at weighing the interests of the
excluded against those of the governing body ought to be made." Id. at 784-85
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Old Equal Protection
Identifying Legislative Purpose
The imposition of special burdens, the granting of special bene-
fits, must always be justified. They can only be justified as be-
ing directed at the elimination of some social evil, the achievement
of some public good. When and if [hostility and prejudice or
favoritism and partiality] replace a concern for the public good as
the "purpose" of the law, there is a violation of the equal pro-
tection prohibition against discriminatory legislation.97
A prerequisite of a valid legal discrimination is the requirement
that it promote a constitutionally permissible end. This first requires
a judicial finding of that legislative purpose--a task complicated by
the fact that the courts are not bound by express statutory language
nor legislative intent.9 8
In the case of the single-family zoning ordinance the problem is
particularly complex. The traditional zoning objectives of controlling
neighborhood density, traffic, noise, and conserving municipal serv-
ices9" have all been articulated as possible "purposes" by courts pass-
ing on the constitutionality of the ordinance.100 Of these ends, den-
sity has generally received the most attention by the courts, and
quite often the investigation of purpose has terminated with this find-
ing.101 Although a substantial body of litigation has in the past sus-
tained zoning regulations upon a finding of density or related pur-
(emphasis added). See also Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84
HAav. L. Rnv. 1645 (1971).
97. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 84, at 358.
98. For the court's proclivity to "look beneath the surface" in determining leg-
islative purpose, see Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (No. 6,546 C.C.D.) (Cal.
1879) where Justice Stephen Field found a San Francisco jail ordinance requiring uni-
form hair length to be racially motivated against Chinese, although the ordinance
was neutral in its language). See also Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F.
Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 368 U.S. 515 (1962); Mulkey v. Reit-
man, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 533-34, 413 P.2d 825, 828-29, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884-85 (1966),
aff'd, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). A recent discussion of this topic by
the California Supreme Court can be found in Parr v. Municipal Court, 3 Cal. 3d
861, 865-68, 479 P.2d 353, 356-59, 92 Cal. Rptr. 153, 156-59 (1971).
Relatedly, when courts are confronted with more than one possible legislative ob-
jective, they are not bound to regard only the "most probable." See Two Guys from
Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 592-98 (1961); Goesaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1948); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61, 78-81 (1911).
99. See note 1 supra.
100. See, e.g., Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D.
Cal. 1970); Planning & Zoning Comnm'n v. Synanon Foundation, 153 Conn. 305, 216
A.2d 442 (1966); Newark v. Johnson, 70 NJ. Super. 381, 175 A.2d 500 (L. Div. 1960).
101. Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Synanon Foundation, Inc., 153 Conn. 305,
216 A.2d 442 (1966).
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poses,"' recent cases indicate that even these well established zoning
objectives are not immune from constitutional attack. 3
It is unrealistic to regard these limited zoning objectives as con-
stituting the most probable motivation of newly amended single-fam-
ily zoning ordinances. If density or traffic congestion were in fact the
primary concerns of the community, their regulation through imposi-
tion of family restrictions represents a rather circuitous method of
coping with such problems.
In recent usage, the more probable purpose of the single-family
ordinance is simply to segregate families from nonconforming social
units believed to endanger traditional family survival on both moral
and economic grounds. This, as has been noted, is a "purpose" not di-
rectly examined by courts examining the constitutionality of the legis-
lation.
A few courts have peripherally touched upon the economic threat
involved in tolerating the residency of nonfamily groups. The District
Court in Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan04 stated this explicitly:
Many older neighborhoods have large, once-distinguished town
houses which are not owner occupied. Often owners find it more
profitable to rent these dwellings, not to single families, but to large
groups of unrelated persons with independent sources of income.
Such groups are able to pay, collectively, far more in rent than can
traditional families with one, or at best two, wage earners. Thus
the rent structure of the whole neighborhood may be affected by
opening R-1 zones to large, unrelated living groups. As the rent
and property value structure of the neighborhood is changed, single
families move out, and the character of the area is altered. Zoning
laws, within limits . . . can take account of these economic factors,
and this . . . might provide a rational basis for the classification
herein questioned.'05
102. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
See generally I ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 7.06; 1 Rathkopf, supra note 1, at 1.
103. Recent litigation arising in Pennsylvania is particularly significant, as the su-
preme court of that state has traditionally taken a more conservative stand on zoning
matters. In Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), the court struck down
a zoning ordinance excluding apartments observing, "Nether Providence Township
may not permissibly choose to only take on as many people as can live in single-
family housing, in effect freezing the population at near present levels. Obviously, if
every municipality took that view, population spread would be completely frustrated.
Municipal services must be provided somewhere, and if Nether Providence is a logical
place for development to take place, it could not be heard to say that it will not bear
its rightful part of the burden." Id. at 244-45, 263 A.2d at 398-99. See also Nat.
Land & Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 527-28, 215 A.2d 597, 610 (1965);
Comment, The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Exclusionary Suburban Zoning: From
Bilbar to Girsh-A Decade of Change, 16 VILL. L. REV. 507 (1971).
104. 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
105. Id. at 912-13.
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Although zoning to "preserve neighborhood character" is becoming
increasingly subject to successful legal attack, 0 6 the protected status
of the traditional family might exempt the single-family ordinance from
these holdings l0
The morality facet of single-family exclusionary zoning has re-
ceived even less attention by the courts, but its tacit influence should
not be ignored. A suggestion that local disapproval of the sexual hab-
its of nonconforming groups motivated the exclusionary efforts emerges
in the New Jersey cases.' In Larson v. Mayor & Council of Spring
Lake Heights,09 for example, considerable reference was made to the
"lewd conduct ' of unrelated persons cohabitating and to "[i]ncidents of
immoral conduct and illicit relations inside the dwellings . . .,.
Regardless of whether the threat is viewed in economic or moral
terms, the protection of the conventional family remains a highly prob-
able objective of the recent single-family zoning practices. Whether
this is a constitutionally permissible objective (and whether, even if
permissible, it will sanction affirmative discrimination against non-
favored groups) remains to be adjudicated. The question cannot, how-
ever, be resolved until it is directly raised. This is a development in-
hibited by the court's adherence to the old equal protection test which
does not require an examination of the most probable legislative
purpose."'1
Assessing the Reasonability of Classification
Even permissible legislative objectives will not sustain discrimina-
tory legislation if the method of classification adopted is judged un-
reasonably related to the attainment of the legislative purpose."' A
classification must be compared with an ideal which is neither overly
broad nor underinclusive in its scope."13  Equal protection principles
do not, however, require mathematical exactitude;'" the question
really involves the amount of deviance which is legally tolerable.
106. See note 103 supra.
107. See notes 2, 3 & 5 supra.
108. Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J Super. 341, 343,
271 A.2d 430, 431 (App. Div. 1970); Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan,
111 N.J. Super. 359, 363, 268 A.2d 333, 335 (L. Div. 1970), rev'd on other grounds,
59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971); Larson v. Mayor of Spring Lake Heights, 99 N.J.
Super. 365, 369, 240 A.2d 31, 33 (L. Div. 1968).
109. 99 N.J. Super. 365, 240 A.2d 31 (L. Div. 1968).
110. Id. at 369, 240 A.2d at 33.
111. See discussion in note 98 supra.
112. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 84, at 346.
113. See generally id. at 344-53.
114. "Under our constitutional system the states in determining the reach and
scope of particular legislation need not provide 'abstract symmetry'. . . . [Tihey
may mark and set apart the classes and types of problems according to the needs and
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As previously noted, subjecting the single-family ordinance to the
Tussman and tenBroek test is complicated by the fact that the courts
have not reached agreement in identifying the legislative purpose. If,
however, the prevailing explicit zoning objectives-density, traffic reg-
ulation and related goals-are considered, the single-family ordinance
becomes susceptible to charges of both overbreadth and underinclu-
siveness.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, for example, has taken special cog-
nizance of the matter of underinclusiveness:
In terms of permissible zoning objectives, a group of persons
bound together only by their common desire to operate a single
housekeeping unit, might be thought to have a transient quality
that would affect adversely the stability of the neighborhood, and
so depreciate the value of other property. An ordinance requiring
relationship by blood, marriage or adoption could be regarded as
tending to limit the intensity of land use. And it might be con-
sidered that a group of unrelated persons would be more likely
to generate traffic and parking problems than would an equal
number of related persons.
But none of these observations reflects a universal truth.
Family groups are mobile today, and not all family units are
internally stable and well-disciplined. Family groups with two
or more cars are not unfamiliar. And so far as intensity of use
is concerned, the definition in the present ordinance, with its ref-
erence to the "respective spouses" of persons related by blood,
marriage or adoption, can hardly be regarded as an effective
control upon the size of family units. 115
Plaintiffs in the Palo Alto commune case have also raised the issue
of classificatory underinclusiveness with special force regarding density
arguments. 116
Courts applying the old equal protection test tend, in general, to
be tolerant of legislation which suffers from underinclusiveness. 117 The
as dictated or suggested by experience." Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1942) (citation omitted).
115. City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 437-38, 216 N.E.2d 116,
119 (1966).
116. Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
Judge Wollenberg dismissed the plaintiff's arguments, stating: "given the State's clear
interest in preserving the integrity of the biological and/or legal family, and given the
fact that the average size of even the traditional family is less than four members, the
Court sees no arbitrariness in limiting the number of unrelated persons living in an
R-1 dwelling, while not so limiting the size of the traditional family in such dwellings.
From the standpoint of population density, the ordinances distinguishing between
traditional families and groups of unrelated persons do not discriminate between them,
save insofar as is necessary to promote clear, and overriding, State interests." Id.
at 912.
117. "[TIhe Court has defended under-inclusive classifications on various grounds."
See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 84, at 348.
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charge of overbreadth, however, is more serious, for "over-inclusive
classifications reach out to the innocent bystander, the hapless victim
of circumstance or association." 118
With regard to single-family zoning practices, the argument of
overinclusiveness is typically couched in the "two schoolteachers" anal-
ogy; critics of the legislation cite that potential exclusion as illustrative
of the unreasonability of the classification. The New Jersey court, for
example, made such an argument when reviewing an exceptionally re-
strictive police ordinance which required household "permanence"
(non-seasonal characteristics) in addition to biological and legal family
ties for cohabitation. The court reasoned:
And by what stretch of the general police power can a munici-
pality declare it illegal as necessary for the prevention of vice,
drunkenness and immorality, or the preservation of the public
health, safety and welfare, to ban during the summer months
two spinster sisters who want to vacation together?" 9
The court admonished the municipalities against "burning the house to
roast the pig" and continued:
Rather than make any attempt to enforce existing statutes and
ordinances relating to the actions complained of [problems of
noise, immorality, parking violations, etc.] the municipalities
passed additional comprehensive ordinances outlawing otherwise
legal conduct which was thought to be a prime source of the
obnoxious and illegal conduct. But '[T]he duty of the township of-
ficials is to suppress the disorder and to punish those who are
guilty of the illegal act, not to prevent the performance of the
legal act'. 120
Therefore, viewed under the standards of the old equal protection
test, the constitutionality of recent family zoning practices is not as-
sured. Even if the courts fail to probe the probable nonzoning ob-
jectives of such practices, the avowed objectives of density and traffic
regulation may be insufficient to sustain the legislation. 12  More seri-
ously, the ordinances remain vulnerable to charges that they inade-
quately correlate the offenders with the offense sought to be regulat-
ed, 1 2 in contravention of equal protection principles.
118. Id. at 351.
119. Larson v. Mayor of Spring Lake Heights, 99 N.J. Super. 365, 375, 240 A.2d
31, 37 (L. Div. 1968). Similar arguments were considered by the Supreme Court of
Illinois in City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 435, 216 N.E.2d 116, 118
(1966).
120. Larson v. Mayor of Spring Lake Heights, 99 N.J. Super. 365, 374, 240 A.2d
31, 36 (1968).
121. See note 103 supra.
122. See text accompanying notes 112-20 supra.
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Modern Equal Protection Review
Invoking the test
Traditionally, only two grounds have stimulated judicial applica-
tion of the stricter modem equal protection test: a finding that the
challenged legislation impinged upon certain socially protected "funda-
mental" interests12  or that it involved "suspect" classifications. 124
Because the boundaries of both these grounds have not been clearly
demarcated, the first aspect of the modem equal protection test is
the argument for its invocation.
Plaintiffs in Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan.25 have most
recently sought the court's application of the stricter equal protection
test to the issue of single-family zoning. Although their arguments
have proved unsuccessful at the trial level, they are nonetheless sugges-
tive of the issues to be determined in the future.
Basically, the Palo Alto litigants relied upon "fundamental inter-
est" arguments, alleging that the municipal ordinance affected their
rights to privacy and free association. 126  In asserting the former, the
plaintiffs relied upon Griswold v. Connecticut12 as establishing pri-
vacy as a fundamental interest. They further argued that the zoning
ordinances-enforceable "only through insidious invasions of ...
homes, such as peeking through windows and obtaining and executing
inspection search warrants" 128-jeopardized this interest.
The federal district court was unpersuaded by these arguments.
Without passing upon the status of "privacy" as a fundamental inter-
est,' 29 the court found that there was
123. Interests which have been identified as deserving this label include voting,
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); procreation, Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); certain criminal procedural rights,
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); and more recently, the right to interstate
travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See generally Developments in
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. RV. 1065, 1120-22, 1127-31 (1969).
124. Suspect classifications include, inter alia, those based upon race, McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), and national ancestry, Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944). Classifications based upon distinctions of wealth have also been
struck down, but these have usually involved other rights of fundamental importance.
See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (indigent criminal appeals). See generally Developments
in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1124-27 (1969).
125. 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
126. Id. at 910.
127. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
128. Brief for Appellants at 41, Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F.
Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
129. This status has been questioned with regard to the breadth of the constitu-
tional right guaranteed by Griswold. See, e.g., Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110
(D. Conn. 1966).
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[No showing of warrantless searches, unreasonable prying, or of
any inevitability of the 'repulsive' investigative tactics which the
Supreme Court in Griswold found antithetical to the constitutional
ideal of individual and marital privacy.130
Palo Alto litigants' second claim was that the ordinance affected
their right to associate, citing cases to document the scope of this con-
stitutional protection."' In rejecting the plaintiff's second argument
the court observed:
Plaintiffs are unquestionably sincere in seeking to devise and
test new life-styles, but the communes they have formed are le-
gally indistinguishable from such traditional living groups as reli-
gious communities and residence clubs. The right to form such
groups may be constitutionally protected, but the right to insist
that these groups live under the same roof in any part of the
city they choose, is not. To define "association" so broadly,
and to apply Shapiro so widely, would be to dilute the effective-
ness of that special branch of jurisprudence which our tradition
has developed to protect the truly vital interests of the citizenry. 3 2
Some legal observors have suggested a third "fundamental inter-
est" involved in the exclusion of nonconforming social groups: namely,
the right of equal access to housing. 3 The Supreme Court has
furnished some grounds for asserting this right, in a series of cases be-
ginning with Shelley v. Kraemer.134 Here Justice Vinson, writing for
the majority, argued:
It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be
protected from discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth
Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of
property. Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was re-
garded. . . as an essential pre-condition to the realization of other
basic civil rights and liberties which the Amendment was intended
to guarantee.' 35
In Reitman v. Mulkey'3" the Court moved even closer to asserting
a right to open housing, with Justice Douglas' concurring observation,
"[u]rban housing is clearly marked with the public interest.' 11 3 7  Com-
menting upon these and related cases, Professor Sager has argued:
130. Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908, 912 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
131. Id. at 911; Brief for Appellants at 32-33, Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan,
321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
132. 321 F. Supp. at 911-912.
133. See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and
the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 787-90 (1969); Note, Constitutional law-Equal
Protection-Zoning--Snob Zoning: Must a Man's Home be a Castle? 69 MIcH. L. REv.
339 (1970).
134. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
135. Id. at 10.
136. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
137. Id. at 385.
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One thing emerges with clarity . . . equal access to housing is
regarded by the Court as a matter of the most serious social and
constitutional concern. Given the close relationship between res-
idential isolation and vulnerability to governmental and private
discrimination, inferior housing and education, and social im-
mobility, this concern does not seem either surprising or mis-
placed.13 8
Accordingly, Professor Sager has urged the courts to extend the
right of open housing to the indigent, as well as to those discriminated
against on racial grounds.' 39 It is unclear, however, whether a similar
extension of the privilege may be made on behalf of nonconforming
social groups; this remains a prime matter for future adjudication. 4
Beyond allegations of "harrassment" the Palo Alto litigants did
not assert the second ground for applying the modem equal protection
test, namely, an unlawful discrimination based upon "suspect" classi-
fications."' A recent California case, though not involving zoning is-
sues, does furnish some basis for this argument.
In Parr v. Municipal Court'4 2 the California Supreme Court
struck down a Carmel ordinance prohibiting the sitting, walking, and
standing on public property in certain city areas. Although the lan-
guage of the ordinance was neutral upon its face, the Carmel City
Council had attached a "Declaration of Urgency" indicating that the
ordinance was directed against "undesirable and unsanitary visitors to
the City, sometimes known as 'hippies.' 1413 The Court, finding the
ordinance violative of equal protection principles observed:
[W]e cannot be oblivious to the transparent, indeed the avowed,
purpose and the inevitable effect of the ordinance in question: to
discriminate against an ill-defined social caste whose members are
deemed pariahs by the city fathers. This court has been consist-
ently vigilant to protect racial groups from the effects of official
prejudice, and we can be no less concerned because the human
beings currently in disfavor are identifiable by dress and atti-
tudes rather than by color.' 44
This case suggests a possibility that communes and other innovative
138. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 790 (1969).
139. The Supreme Court, however, recently refused to make this extension in
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). The Court upheld California's practice of
subjecting low-cost housing projects to a local referendum. Finding no racial dis-
crimination involved, the majority refused to consider economic discrimination and
apply the more modern Equal Protection test.
140. Significantly, in James v. Valtierra both the majority and minority opinions
avoided any allusion to a fundamental housing right.
141. See note 124 supra.
142. 3 Cal. 3d 861, 479 P.2d 353, 92 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1971).
143. Id. at 864, 479 P.2d at 354, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
144. Id. at 871, 479 P.2d at 360, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
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domestic experiments may be afforded the same protection extended
in Carmel to "hippies"-thereby making a harrassment of these non-
conformists "suspect."
Applying ihe Modern Equal Protection Test
Application of the modem equal protection test to single-family
zoning practices could affect the court's determination of the consti-
tutionality of such ordinances in two ways. First, the stricter test
would require a closer scrutiny of legislative purpose, increasing the
possibility that the nonzoning objectives previously ignored by courts,
would be exposed. 145 Second, proponents of the zoning ordinances
would have to demonstrate more than a mere rational relationship
between the classification and its purpose. That is, in order to sustain
a discrimination against nonlegal families, the municipalities would have
to prove an overriding state interest warranting the -unequal treatment
of this segment of society.'4 6  Whether traditional zoning objectives
such as density and traffic regulation or alternative social objectives
such as the "protection" of the conventional family would constitute
such a compelling state interest remains a matter for future determi-
nation.
Equal Protection: Procedural Aspect
The remaining component of the equal protection guarantee is the
least controversial: it is simply the requirement that the laws be
equally enforced and fairly administered. The single-family zoning
ordinance is particularly susceptible to abuse in this regard. A strict
enforcement of the ordinance would require nighttime investigations of
dwellings to determine the status of the occupants. Equal protection
principles would clearly require that such searches not be directed
exclusively against one class of persons, distinguishable on racial or
economic grounds. However, as has been noted, Paar v. Municipal
Court'4 7 suggests that a discrimination enforced upon the basis of
"dress and attitudes" is equally suspect. By what basis then, are city
officials legally entitled to direct their search for zoning violators?
The mere potential of a discriminatory enforcement may be suffi-
cient to render an ordinance invalid on equal protection grounds. 48
Justice Field, invalidating a San Francisco ordinance as early as
1879 made this point:
145. "We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties
are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade
or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined." Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
146. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
147. 3 Cal. 3d 861, 479 P.2d 353, 92 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1971).
148. Id. at 868, 479 P.2d at 358, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
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[W]e cannot shut our eyes to matters of public notoriety and
general cognizance. When we take our seats on the bench we are
not struck with blindness, and forbidden to know as judges what
we see as men; and where an ordinance, though general in its
terms, only operates upon a special race, sect or class, it being
universally understood that it is to be enforced only against that
race, sect or class, we may justly conclude that it was the inten-
tion of the body adopting it that it should only have such opera-
tion, and treat it accordingly. 14 9
More recently, the California Supreme Court took a similar approach
with regard to the Carmel "hippie" ordinance previously discussed.' 50
Echoing Justice Field, the Court observed:
In construing the Carmel ordinance, we may not overlook its
probable impact. Although the operative subsections prohibit all
persons from sitting on the grass and misusing public property, Car-
mel's police officers and prosecutor are unlikely to ignore the
council's clear expression of legislative purpose in the Declara-
tion of Urgency. The inevitable effect must be discriminatory
enforcement consistent with the discriminatory purpose ...
the police will direct their efforts to the task of ridding Carmel's
public property of the menace of hippies, and the public pros-
ecutor will use his discretion to most effectively attack the source
the problem . .. . 51
The California Supreme Court accordingly found this practice to be
violative of equal protection mandates, and judged the ordinance un-
constitutional partly on the grounds of its susceptibility to this abuse. 15 2
The typical single-family zoning ordinance involves enforcement ques-
tions of a similar kind, equally amenable to this analysis.
Conclusion
This note has documented the extent to which recent zoining
practices have regulated the internal composition of homes. It has
been shown that the courts have not authoritatively confirmed this
extension of local power, 153 and that this judicial determination is in-
timately connected with equal protection considerations. 5 4
Arguments have been presented to show that the single-family
zoning ordinance may prove vulnerable to constitutional attack on
three separate grounds: First, that the ordinances are motivated for
possibly impermissible purposes, namely the harrassment of noncon-
149. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 255 (No. 6,546) (C.C.D. Cal. 1879).
150. See text accompanying notes 142-43 supra.
151. 3 Cal. 3d at 869, 479 P.2d at 358, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
152. Id.
153. See text accompanying notes 30-81 supra.
154. See text accompanying notes 82-152 supra.
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forming social units.1'5 Second, assuming a valid legislative purpose,
the single-family statute is still vulnerable to the charge that it is both
under- and over-inclusive in scope. 156  Finally, the ordinance raises
serious questions of unenforceability within the equal protection stric-
tures.15 7
In short, there remain two significant questions: (1) Is it con-
stitutionally permissible to discriminate against specific nonconform-
ing social units through their dwelling habits? and (2) Is zoning the
proper legal mechanism for implementing this practice?
Whether the single-family zoning ordinance is a precursor of even
deeper state incursions into private living styles, or whether such ordi-
nances will fall by the wayside in the general onslaught against exclu-
sionary zoning515 remains the unanswered question for litigation in the
1970's.
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155. See text accompanying notes 97-111 supra.
156. See text accompanying notes 112-22 supra.
157. See text accompanying notes 147-52 supra.
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